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where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. Using the coefficient of variation as 
the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise 
private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a 
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Most industrial countries levy a tax on wealth transfers. However, there are substantial
diﬀerences in the legal framework of the tax system. In France and Germany, on the one
hand, the tax is levied on inheritances. The institutional setting further forces donors to
divide their estate equally among their own children (see Cremer and Pestieau, 2003). In the
United States and in the United Kingdom on the other hand, there is a tax on estates and
donors enjoy more freedom of bequests, although state rules might restrict disinheritance.
What many countries seem to have in common is an ongoing and controversial debate about
taxation of wealth transfers. Some countries, including the US, contemplate to phase out
taxes on wealth transfer in the near future.
O n eo ft h em a i na r g u m e n t si nt h ep u b l i ca n da c a d e m i cd i s c u s s i o ni st h er o l eo fw e a l t h
transfers for the inequality of wealth. Wealth is highly concentrated: in many industrial
countries, the share of the richest 1% of households in net worth is estimated to be 20-30%
(see Davies and Shorrocks, 2000), whereas an equal distribution would imply that any π%
of the population hold π% of the total wealth. Wealth transfers in form of bequests or
inter-vivo transfers are often seen as one of the major culprits for the inequality of wealth.2
Since there is some concern about the level of concentration, the taxation of wealth transfers
is frequently identiﬁed as an adequate policy to mitigate the concentration of wealth.
This paper investigates the role of bequests for the distribution of wealth and the eﬀects
of redistributive taxation.3 We construct a simple model with stochastic individual income
to analyze distributional eﬀects by comparing properties of distributions in an overlapping
generations setting. While focusing on steady states for our main results, we provide a
complete analysis of transitional dynamics as well.
We ﬁnd that intergenerational wealth transfers per se have an equalizing eﬀect on the
distribution of wealth when the coeﬃcient of variation is chosen as the measure of inequality.
Since this result can be seen in general equilibrium only, we consider general equilibrium
analysis as being important. In our model, bequests have two eﬀects. On the one hand,
there is an increase in the variance of wealth. On the other, as these transfers imply that
2See Charles and Hurst (2003) for an empirical analysis of the reasons for a positive relationship between
wealth of parents and children before bequests. Bowles and Gintis (2002) discuss the various mechanisms
through which economic status is transfered across generations. The eﬀect of tax changes on the importance
of gifts relative to bequests are analyzed by Bernheim et al. (2004).
3We do not study eﬃciency aspects as e.g. Blumkin and Sadka (2004) who analyse the eﬃciency cost of
estate taxation. See also Cremer and Pestieau (2001) and Cremer et al. (2003) for an optimal tax analysis
under asymmetric information or Grossmann and Poutvaara (2005).
2wealth holdings of a family at a certain point in time are determined not only by own income
but by a weighted sum of own and ancestor’s income, average wealth holdings increase as
well. As the greater average wealth compensates for higher variance, the inequality of wealth,
as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation, falls. We further ﬁnd that this result is robust
when correlation across parent’s and child’s income, endogenous labour supply and a CES
instead of a logarithmic speciﬁcation of the utility function are introduced into the model.
When we turn to economic policy, we allow the government to tax bequests and redistrib-
ute revenue among the young. We ﬁnd that the redistributive policy reduces the variance of
wealth while keeping the average wealth holding constant. As a result, inequality of wealth
—a g a i nm e a s u r e db yt h ec o e ﬃcient of variation — falls.
Finally, we analyze how taxation aﬀects the Gini coeﬃcient. Our results are robust to
the choice of inequality measure - taxation and redistribution decreases inequality. We are
therefore conﬁdent that our results can directly be used for policy debates. Note that due
to the simplicity of our modeling choice, we are able to derive all results apart from the Gini
result in ch. 5.3 analytically.
The relation between intergenerational transfers and the wealth distribution has already
found some attention among economists. In contrast to the frequently alleged concentration
increasing inﬂuence (e.g. Meade, 1976; Wilhelm, 1997), the results of some models indicate
that intergenerational wealth transfers imply more equality of wealth. The best known
argument is the compensation principle between parents and children where bequests serve
to compensate diﬀerences in random labour income (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Davies, 1986;
Davies and Kuhn, 1991; see Davies and Shorrocks, 2000, ch. 2.3 for a survey4).
When it comes to taxation of inheritances, some argue that when "inheritance plays
an equalizing role, it seems likely that <...> taxes would be disequalizing" (Davies, 1986,
p. 539). In fact, this result has been claimed or shown by Becker and Tomes (1979) or
Davies (1986) for a long-run steady state. It was put into some perspective by Davies and
Kuhn (1991) who found that in the short-run, taxation could be equalizing. Some seem
to summarize the current state of knowledge as if only under exceptional circumstances,
taxation of bequests would imply a more equal distribution of wealth: "if there are incomplete
markets <...> taxation <...> can reduce <...> inequality" (Gokhale et al., 2001, p. 97).5
Compared to this literature, the present paper conﬁrms that bequests per se imply a
4There is also a large literature that looks at wealth inequality and bequests from a quantitative perspec-
tive. Gokhale et al. (2001) is a recent example. They also provide an overview of previous work.
5See, however, early work by Pestieau and Posen (1979) who show in a framework with more assets and
taxes that taxation can be equalizing.
3more equal wealth distribution indeed. The mechanism stressed here, however, is completely
independent of the Becker-Tomes compensation principle. The wealth distribution becomes
more equal because of the increase in expected wealth which overcompensates the increase
in the variance of wealth such that the coeﬃcient of variation falls. As this mechanism relies
on capital accumulation, a general equilibrium setup is important.6
The reason why we ﬁnd that taxation of bequests has an equalizing eﬀect lies in the
assumption about what parents value. Becker (1974) introduced the concept of "social
income" which was used by Becker and Tomes (1979) in the form of "family income" or
by Davies (1986) and others (again, see the references in Davies and Shorrocks, 2000, ch.
2.3) as "family wealth". The idea - put simply - is that parents care about total income
of children, i.e. labour income plus inheritances after tax and lump-sum transfers. As a
consequence, when maximizing utility, parents take family income as the disposable income
which they split optimally between own consumption and total income of children. In the
present paper, parents care about (after-tax) bequests per se - we therefore follow the joy-
of-giving approach. With this setup, parents do not take family income into account but
simply their own income which they split optimally between own consumption and bequests.
This simple diﬀerence in preferences implies that under joy-of-giving, taxation of bequests is
neutral with respect to average wealth and therefore, by decreasing the variance of bequests,
implies lower inequality in wealth.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model.
Section 3 studies the evolution path of the economy and steady state properties. In section
4, we study the distribution of wealth and the role of bequests for inequality. We also allow
for a correlation between parent’s and child’s income as an extension to the basic model.
Section 5 then investigates distributional eﬀects of taxation and checks robustness of our
results by using the Gini coeﬃcient as an alternative measure for inequality. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
6Other general equilibrium models analysing the eﬀect of bequests but not focusing on our questions
include e.g. Stiglitz (1969) or Ioannides and Sato (1987).
7For a survey of transfer motives and some of their implications, see Masson and Pestieau (1997).
42T h e m o d e l
2.1 Households
We consider a society with overlapping generations. Each individual lives for two periods.
In each period t t h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e rn of families or dynasties consisting of one parent
and one child. When young, individuals work and earn labour income. When old, parents
are retired, consume their savings, and leave a bequest to the child. We assume that workers
diﬀer with respect to their ability and hence productivity. Let lit denote the eﬀective inelastic
labour supply of an individual i. At the beginning of period t,e a c hw o r k e rd r a w slit,w h e r e
lit > 0, from an identical distribution with expectation and variance given by
E (lit)=l ≡ 1, Var(lit)=σ
2. (1)
As the lit are identically and independently distributed (iid) random variables, their covari-
ance is zero, Cov(lir,l is)=0 , for r 6= s. Without loss of generality, we set l =1 .
Since in each period an equal number of individuals enters and leaves the economy, there
is a stationary number of families. While the microeconomic level — that is, individual
income, inheritance, savings — is characterized by uncertainty, there is certainty on the per
capita level — average eﬃcient labour supply, capital-per-worker, and interest rate and wage
are nonrandom variables. For example, the individual eﬃcient labour supply lit is a random
variable with variance Var(lit)=σ2.T h e a v e r a g e e ﬃcient labour supply is Σn
i=1lit/n with
Var(Σn
i=1lit/n)=σ2/n which tends to zero for n →∞ . Hence, for n →∞ , the probability
that the average eﬃcient labour supply deviates from its expectation is zero.
Individuals consume in both periods and leave a bequest that immediately passes to their
child at the end of the second period. A person belonging to family i, born at the beginning










by choosing consumption c
y
it when young, co
it+1 when old, and the bequest bit+1 passed on to
the child. Note that utility depends on the amount bit+1 the child receives after tax. This
utility function captures the joy-of-giving idea: "consumers leave bequests simply because
they obtain utility directly from the bequest" (Abel and Warshawsky, 1988, p. 145).8 In the
ﬁrst period, the budget constraint for an individual of generation t is
wtlit + bit + gt = c
y
it + sit, (3)
8For an empirical evaluation of various bequest motives, see e.g. Light and McGarry (2003) and the
references therein.
5where bit denotes after tax inheritance received from the parent, wtlit stochastic income
depending on wage wt per eﬃciency unit and the random ability of the individual lit, gt
the uniform lump-sum transfer received from the government in case that it levies a tax on
bequests, and sit savings. In the second period, the constraint is
sit [1 + rt+1]=c
o
it+1 +( 1+τ)bit+1, (4)
where rt+1 is the interest rate and τ ≥ 0 t h et a xo nb e q u e s t s . P a r e n t sh a v et ot a k ei n t o
account that part of their wealth transferred to the child may be collected by the government.
With a positive tax rate τ,i n t e n d i n gt ol e a v ebit+1 to the child, the parent has to bequeath
(1 + τ)bit+1. The individual decision is under certainty, since bequests and labour income
are received before deciding about consuming and saving in the ﬁrst period, and the interest
rate is not random.
To keep things as simple as possible, we start with a Cobb-Douglas utility function (see
app. 7.2.1 for an extension)
Uit = αlnc
y




it+1 +( 1− β)lnbit+1
¤
, (5)
with 1/2 <α<1, 0 <β<1. The preference parameter α must be larger than 1/2 as
otherwise individuals would value future utility from consumption and bequests more than
utility from present consumption and the implied time preference rate would be negative.9
From the ﬁrst-order conditions one can easily derive consumption in each period, savings,
and bequests left to the child
c
y
it = α[wtlit + bit + gt], (6)
sit =( 1 − α)(wtlit + bit + gt), (7)
c
o
it+1 = βsit [1 + rt+1], (8)
bit+1 =
(1 − β)sit [1 + rt+1]
1+τ
. (9)
Independent of their ability or inherited wealth, individuals always consume the share α of
their income wtlit+bit+gt in the ﬁrst period. The rest is saved and yields the return 1+rt+1.
At the end of the second period, the share β of savings plus the accrued interest is consumed,
1 − β is passed to the child.
Note that savings in equation (7) are independent of τ. T h et a xo nw e a l t ht r a n s f e r s
drives a wedge between the relative prices of consumption and leaving a bequest. As a
9We show in the appendix in section 7.2.1 that one of our main results holds also for a more general CES
utility function. Section 7.1 discusses the speciﬁcation in (5).
6consequence, households will substitute ﬁrst period consumption for bequests. However,
due to the Cobb-Douglas utility, substitution and income eﬀect neutralize each other so
that a tax on bequests does not inﬂuence individual savings. However, taxing bequests and
redistributing tax revenue will have an eﬀect on households’ budgets through gt and thus on
the individual amount saved.
2.2 Firms
Firms use labour and capital as inputs and produce a single (numeraire) good that can be
consumed or invested. Labour is supplied inelastically (but see app. 7.2.2). There is perfect
competition and ﬁrms use a Cobb-Douglas technology. In intensive form, the production
function can be expressed as yt = f(kt)=Ak
γ
t , where yt and kt are output per worker and




− δ = γAk
γ−1
t − δ, (10)






where δ is the depreciation rate.
2.3 The government
The only tax instrument of the government is the tax τ ≥ 0 on bequests. The government
levies this tax and redistributes revenue lump-sum among the young generation. In each
period, the government’s budget is balanced. Every young individual receives the same




There is variation in the individual bequests and accordingly diﬀerent tax revenues per
bequest. Due to the large number of families, the average tax revenue of the government is
deterministic, however. Hence, the government does not need to form expectations about
tax revenue.
3 Transitional dynamics and steady state
We are now in the position to study the dynamics of capital intensity kt and to calculate
its steady state value. Furthermore, we can investigate the development of the distribution
7of wealth: The law of large numbers tells us that if the individual probability to "draw" a
certain amount of wealth equal to at most ¯ a is given by π%, then, in a large economy, a
share of π% of the whole population will hold at most that amount of wealth ¯ a.I n o r d e r
to understand the national distribution of wealth, we therefore just have to understand the
properties of the distribution of individual wealth.
In what follows, we investigate convergence in two dimensions: convergence of the cap-
ital stock at the macroeconomic level and convergence of the distribution of wealth at the
microeconomic level. The distribution of wealth will be studied under the assumption that
the economy has already reached the macroeconomic steady state.
3.1 The capital stock
Let us ﬁrst study the dynamics of kt. From the goods’ market equilibrium it follows that
households’ assets in period t +1— all owned by members of the generation born in t —
equal the period’s capital stock. We will show that a (deterministic) stable steady state
exists. While such a proof is self-evident in deterministic settings, it is not obvious in our
economy with stochastic productivity at the individual level. Using the same approach as










Using (7), (9) and (12), observing that for a suﬃciently large economy, i.e. for n →∞ ,
Σn
i=1lit/n = E (lit)=1 , and substituting further for wt and rt from (10) and (11), we obtain
after rearranging (see app. A.1)
kt+1 = c1k
γ
t + c2kt, (14)
where c1 ≡ (1 − γβ)(1− α)A and c2 ≡ (1 − α)(1− β)(1− δ).E q u a t i o n ( 1 4 ) d e t e r m i n e s
the evolution of kt starting with an initial value. Note that kt is independent of the tax
rate τ. Taxing wealth transfers and redistributing tax yields does not inﬂuence the growth
path of the economy. (This would not be the case if households had preferences other than
Cobb-Douglas.)
3.2 Macroeconomic steady state







8The wage w and interest rate r are calculated from the marginal product of labour and

















= γ+(1−γ)c2 < 1, the steady state is locally stable. A simple graphical
analysis reveals that the steady state is also globally stable.
3.3 The evolution of wealth
We now turn to the evolution at the microeconomic level. Wealth ait+1 of family i in period
t+1is owned by the parent and consists of the savings of the previous period. Equation (7)
implies
ait+1 = sit =( 1− α)(wtlit + bit + gt). (18)
Substituting for bit from (9) and gt from (12) gives
ait+1 =( 1− α)wtlit +
(1 − α)(1 − β)(1 + rt)
1+τ
ait +
τ(1 − α)(1 − β)(1 + rt)
1+τ
kt. (19)
This diﬀerence equation describes the evolution of wealth holdings of a family. As can be
seen from equation (19), several factors determine family wealth in t +1 .F i r s t ,w a g e a n d
interest rate of the previous period, which again depend on the capital intensity of that
period. Second, stochastic income and family wealth of period t,w h i c hi n ﬂuences current
wealth via bequests. And ﬁnally, the third term of equation (19), the government transfer
the young generation receives.
To calculate an explicit solution for the evolution of wealth ait, we consider an economy
which is in its macroeconomic steady state. The capital intensity k,w a g ew, and interest
rate r take their values in (15), (16), and (17) so that we obtain from equation (19)
ait+1 = c3lit + c4ait + c5, (20)
where c3 ≡ (1 − α)w, c4 ≡
(1−α)(1−β)(1+r)
1+τ and c5 ≡
τ(1−α)(1−β)(1+r)
1+τ k. Wealth in period t +1
depends on labour market success today (the ﬁrst term), wealth today (the second) and
government transfers (the third term). Note that k, w,a n dr might vary with parameter
changes since steady states reﬂect diﬀerences in households’ willingness to leave wealth to
the child or in their saving rate.












Intuitively, one would want the value of c4 to lie between zero and one as otherwise the sums
do not converge. Analytically, it can be shown that this is indeed true (cf. app. A.2). As
one can see from equation (21), family wealth in period t depends on the initial wealth ai0
of the family at t =0 , the transfer of the government, and the stochastic productivities lis,
s =0 ,...,t− 1, of all preceding generations. The more luck the ancestors had, the higher
was their labour income and the higher are wealth holdings of the current generation, since
part of the ancestors’ luck is shifted into the future via bequests. However, due to the factor
c4,t h ei n ﬂuence of distant luck on current wealth is weaker than that of the parent’s luck.
3.4 The distribution of wealth
After having studied the actual distribution of wealth, we now look at the characteristics of
the distribution of wealth. Being in t =0today, what is the expected level of wealth at some


















Some algebra shows us (see app. A.3) that
c3+c5








Obviously, expected wealth increases over time when ai0 < k, it decreases when ai0 > k:
When households are "rich" (i.e. they have wealth in t =0above average k), their wealth
tends to decrease, when they are "poor" it tends to increase. All households, independently of






This is due to the fact that shocks are iid such that each household, from whatever level it
starts, has the same expected future path of labour productivities. The long-run mean needs
to be identical to the aggregate capital stock per worker k as the aggregate capital stock is
just the sum of individual wealth holdings and as all individuals are equal in this expected
sense.
Clearly, when ai0 = k, the expected wealth level for each family at each instant t (and
not only in the long run) is E (ait)=k. Note that this is not surprising when remembering
10that we are already in a macroeconomic steady state. As the latter implies that the average
capital stock is given by k for each t, it must be that the expected wealth holding of a
representative family is also k for each t. We will base some of our subsequent discussion on





































When we want to know whether the distribution of ait as a whole, and not just its mean





4 lis in (21) converges for t →∞ . While this is clear for the ﬁrst two terms in
(21), this is less obvious for the remaining term given the stochastic nature of individual
productivity lis. As 0 <c 4 < 1 and if we are willing to assume that Var(lis) < ∞, the
two-series theorem — a simpliﬁed version of the well-known three-series theorem (Shiryaev,




4 lis converges, for t →∞ , with probability 1.10
We may conclude that a limiting distribution for ait exists in a fairly general setting.
4 Wealth inequality and bequests
In this section, we will investigate the role of bequests per se for the inequality of wealth
w i t h i na n da c r o s sg e n e r a t i o n s .W el e a v et h ea n a l y s i so ft a xe ﬀects for the next section and
set τ =0 . Knowing the expectation and the variance of wealth, we use as our measure of






Using this measure raises at least two questions: Why the coeﬃcient of variation and
why the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth? The coeﬃcient of variation is, up to a monotonic
10Note that the assumption of a ﬁnite variance is not satisﬁed for all commonly used distributional as-
sumptions for lis (e.g. Kleiber and Kotz, 2003). However, the empirical evidence suggests that Var(lis) < ∞
is a realistic assumption.
11transformation, a member of the popular generalized entropy class of inequality measures
(see, e.g., Kleiber and Kotz 2003, Ch. 2) and has a geometric interpretation just like the
familiar Gini index (Formby, Smith and Zheng 1999). Unlike the Gini coeﬃcient, it is a
simple function of the ﬁrst and second moments of the underlying distribution. This renders
it particularly suitable in our analytical framework (as also e.g. Davies and Kuhn, 1991, or
Becker and Tomes, 1979) with its emphasis on closed form solutions.
Regarding the second issue, wealth inequality can be argued to be of interest per se.
Moreover, it can easily be shown (see app. A.4) that the determinants of our wealth distrib-
ution are identical to the determinants of the distribution of utility in our model. Comparing
wealth levels therefore allows statements about relative “happiness” levels. The same is true
when expected utility or even when dynasties (thinking beyond individuals that live for two
periods only) are analyzed. Understanding the distribution of wealth is therefore equivalent
to understanding properties of other distributions of interest as well.
4.1 Bequests decrease inequality
Inserting (23) and (26) into (27), we get an expression for the coeﬃcient of variation as
af u n c t i o no fβ. As the sign of dCV (ai∞)/dβ remains ambiguous analytically,11 we obtain
information about the eﬀect of bequests on inequality by comparing two economies, A and
B. We assume that they are identical, except that in economy B households bequeath wealth
(B as bequest), i.e. 0 <β<1, while in A they do not (β =1 ). In both economies, c5 =0
as τ =0in this section. In economy A, plugging (23) and (26) into (27) and observing that




This is intuitively clear, considering that without bequests there is no intergenerational
link and the only stochastic impact results from own current income. In economy B,t h e
coeﬃcient of variation from equation (27) increases over time as parents bequeath wealth to
















The new determinant in the bequest economy is the factor c4 whose origin can best be
seen from the solution of the household’s diﬀerence equation for wealth in (21): c4 is the
11As u ﬃcient (but not necessary) condition under which dCV (ai∞)/dβ ≥ 0 is 2−1/α ≤ γ.T h i sh o l d sf o r
γ ≈ 1/3 and α close to 1/2, i.e. with relatively patient households.
12weight with which past labour productivities aﬀect current wealth. This link between labour
productivities of previous generations and current wealth exists only because of bequests.
With no willingness to bequeath, i.e. b =1 ,c 4 would be zero.














Inequality of wealth is lower in the bequest-economy B than in economy A where parents
derive no utility from leaving a bequest. In contrast to the intuition and general perception,
bequests reduce the intragenerational inequality of wealth.
As mentioned by Davies and Kuhn (1991), bequests may be equalizing through damp-
ening shocks - the Becker-Tomes compensation principle. An equalizing eﬀect is also found
in our model. But the reason for it to occur is diﬀerent. Families in economy B are simply
richer on average than families in economy A, because part of the wealth of the parent is
transferred to the child. This can formally be seen from k in (15) which is decreasing in β.
This leads to a rise in the denominator of CV in economy B,c o m p a r e dt oe c o n o m yA.
The same happens to the numerator, however. While capital intensity is higher in econ-
omy B, workers’ labour earnings in the steady state are also higher in relation to economy A
so that the variance of wealth due to income uncertainty — one might call this the life-cycle
component of savings — is higher. In addition, uncertainty due to bequests also raises the
variance of wealth.
When analyzing the eﬀect of β on the CV in (27) for both numerator and denominator,
we ﬁnd that the rise in expected wealth in the denominator is stronger through bequests
than the rise in the standard deviation of wealth in the numerator. Looking at E (ai∞)
in (23) and Var(ai∞) in (26), we see that bequests, i.e. β<1, aﬀect the labour market
channel c3 and the wealth channel c4 (see (20)). As c3 cancels out in the CV, see e.g. (29),
only the eﬀect of bequests on c4 remains. As c4 is smaller than unity, bequests increase
expected wealth more than the standard deviation of wealth. As a consequence, wealth is
more equally distributed in an economy with bequests. This line of reasoning generalizes to
models, presented in section 7.2, with endogenous labour supply and a CES utility function.
4.2 Bequests with correlation of labour income
Solon (1992) and Zimmermann (1992), studying intergenerational income mobility in the
U.S., point out that there is substantial correlation between income of parents and children.
Their results indicate that the correlation of sons’ log earnings with respect to fathers’
13incomes is at least 0.4. We therefore now relax the assumption that abilities and hence
labour incomes of parent and child are uncorrelated. With positive correlation in earnings,
the probability that children of high income parents earn themselves above average labour
income is also high. In addition, these children receive relatively large inheritances so that
wealth concentration increases. Is it then still true that in economy B, the economy with
bequests, wealth is more equally distributed than in economy A?
We restrict ourselves to an analytically tractable form of correlation. Following Davies
and Kuhn (1991), we assume that eﬀective labour supply regresses to the mean across gen-
erations according to





where l denotes the expected eﬀective labour supply, which for our purposes is set equal
to one, ν with 0 <ν<1 expresses the strength of correlation between fathers’ and sons’
abilities, and the  it+1 represent iid shocks with zero mean, ﬁnite variance and a lower bound
suﬃcient to keep lit+1 > 0.I nt =0 , the process starts with li0 = l +  i0,w h e r el =1 .
Despite the correlation of income, the economy behaves almost exactly as before: capital
intensity still evolves according to equation (14). In economy A where bequests are absent
(i.e. β =1and therefore c4 =0 ), family wealth aA
it+1 from equation (20) is given by (recall
that we still assume that the government levies no tax on bequests so that c5 =0as well)
a
A































1 − ν2 . (31)
In contrast to the coeﬃcient of variation (28) under iid abilities, the concentration of wealth
increases over time here: Though parents do not bequeath wealth, the do "bequeath their


















1 − ν2 >σ . (32)
Hence positive correlation of abilities and thereby income makes the distribution of wealth
more unequal.
14In the bequest society B,w h e r e0 <β<1, the wealth accumulating process is more












= k = c3
1−c4.













(1 − ν2)(1 − c4ν)
. (33)
A comparison with (29) reveals that correlation of income implies a higher inequality of
wealth: The term in brackets is larger than unity as the numerator is larger than one and
the denominator is smaller than one, given that 0 < {c4,ν} < 1.W ec o n c l u d et h a tc o r r e l a t e d
abilities across generations increase wealth inequality both in economies with and without
bequests.
Concerning the eﬀect of bequests on equality, equality of wealth is still higher in bequest




























Some algebra reveals that this ratio is less than or equal to 1 if and only if 0 ≤ (1−c4)(1−ν).
This condition also follows from 0 < {c4,ν} < 1. The result that bequest economies are
characterized by lower inequality than economies without bequests is, therefore, robust to
the introduction of serially correlated abilities.
4.3 Social mobility
Besides intragenerational inequality, one may also pay attention to other dimensions of in-
equality as for example social mobility across generations. Social mobility, as used here, is
the degree to which child’s wealth status may deviate from parent’s status. It measures the
ability of descendants of poor families to become rich and vice versa. Not surprisingly, in
our model bequests have a negative inﬂuence on social mobility. While without bequests
mobility is perfect, the wealth status of the child being solely determined by his own ability,
bequeathing part of their wealth parents also transfer part of their wealth status.
As a formal measure of the degree of immobility, we use the correlation of parent-child
wealth (e.g. Conlisk, 1974). With bequests and τ =0 , equation (20) implies that family
wealth in t +1is given by ait+1 = c3lit + c4ait. The correlation Cor(ait+1,a it) of wealth










15Substituting ait+1 = c4ait + c3lit yields
Cor(ait+1,a it)=










so that there is indeed correlation between parent’s and child’s wealth. The strength of
correlation depends on the parameter c4 and the variance of wealth, which from (25) depends
on further parameters and on time.
As in the long-run, we obtain limt−→∞Cor(ait+1,a it)=c4, we can easily discuss some
determinants of social mobility. Given the deﬁnition of c4 after (20), the interest rate from
(16) and with c1 and c2 from (14), c4 equals (1 − α)(1 − β)(1 + r)/(1 + τ), where r =
γ
1−(1−α)(1−β)(1−δ)
(1−γβ)(1−α) − δ. The parameters of interest here, i.e. those who aﬀect bequests and
thereby social mobility directly, are β and τ.
In a no-bequest economy (β =1 ) the interest rate is ﬁnite (and given by γ/((1 − γ)(1− α))−
δ) which implies that c4 =0 . As a consequence, with no bequests, there is zero correlation
between wealth in t and t +1 . Wealth is purely determined by own iid labour income and
there is perfect social mobility. In an economy with bequests (β<1), a tax τ on bequests
reduces c4 and thereby the link between wealth of subsequent generations. Summarizing, no
bequests and a high tax on bequests are beneﬁcial for social mobility.
5 Wealth inequality and taxation
The previous section has shown that parental willingness to bequeath reduces the intragen-
erational inequality of wealth. We now ask how policy should react to this. Does taxing
bequests further decrease inequality? We study this question for an economy without cor-
relation of labour income in the next subsection and with correlation of labour income
subsequently. The ﬁnal subsection provides results on Gini-coeﬃcients.
5.1 Taxing bequests decreases inequality
Recall that in our model taxing bequests with a tax rate τ>0 does not have any inﬂuence on
private savings on a macroeconomic level: The average capital stock k in (15) is constant, no
matter if there is a redistributive taxation of bequests or not. This is a crucial consequence
16of our joy-of-giving approach and contrasts with the Becker-Tomes setup where a tax on
bequests reduces average wealth (see e.g. (13) in Davis and Kuhn, 1991, or (15) in Davies,
1986). In our approach, individual consumption and savings in (6) and (7) are a share out of
own disposable income, wtlit +bit +gt. In the Becker-Tomes approach, the decision is based
on family income, i.e. own disposable income plus disposable income of the subsequent
generation reduced by their inheritance. Decisions based on own disposable income imply
neutrality of inheritance tax, decisions based on family income do not. The fundamental
reason for this diﬀerences is the speciﬁcation of preferences: In our approach, the utility
function has bequests bit+1 as one argument, in the Becker-Tomes approach, the argument
related to the subsequent generation is their disposable income.
Given our starting point that a0 = k, the expectation E (ait) of family wealth is k for all
t, as discussed before (24). Instead of calculating the coeﬃcient of variation, we therefore
simply concentrate on the variance of wealth as measure of inequality. Again, we will compare
two situations: one, where the government levies no tax (τ =0 ) and one with taxation of
bequests (τ>0). We denote the variance as Var(awt
it ) in the case where τ>0 (‘with tax’)
and as Var(ant
it ) i nt h ec a s ew h e r eτ =0(‘no tax’). We can calculate Var(awt
it ) and Var(ant
it )
from equation (25). Note that in the ‘no tax’ case, we can relate cnt
4 to the deﬁnition of c4
after (20), namely cnt




















s=0[c4 [1 + τ]]
2s.
Hence, the dispersion of family wealth decreases when government levies a tax on bequests
and redistributes revenue among the young generation. Therefore, CV(awt
it ) <C V (ant
it )
for all t ≥ 2 so that the redistributive policy of the government reduces intragenerational
inequality.
In the ﬁrst period, redistribution does not yet work when assuming as we did that wealth
is distributed equally in t =0 . Hence, bequests of that period are also equally distributed
and taxation and redistribution can not alter the concentration of wealth: wealth already is
completely equally distributed. But from t =2on, the tax starts working and wealth is less
concentrated subsequently (in an expected sense). Taxation furthermore increases wealth
mobility. The higher the tax rate τ, the less parental wealth determines the wealth status
of the child. The status of the child is then primarily related to own ability.
17The equalizing eﬀect of bequest taxation hinges on several aspects. First, reactions
of parents and children depend on the underlying motive for wealth transfers. Second,
taxing bequests and redistributing tax revenues does not aﬀect private savings (see app.
7.2.1 for a CES utility function where savings are aﬀected by τ). And third, if wealth
was implicitly “lost” in transit, this in turn would have an inﬂuence on private savings
and the evolution path of the economy with the result that the average wealth holding of
families could decrease. Although the redistribution diminishes the dispersion of wealth,
lower average wealth holdings could then lead to an increase in inequality.
5.2 Taxing bequests with correlation of labour income
Let us now return to the case of correlated labour income as in ch. 4.2. In contrast to this
chapter, however, we now allow for a positive tax rate τ.G i v e nt h a te x p e c t e dw e a l t hr e m a i n s
invariant to tax changes, we again compute the variance of wealth. For an an economy with






2 (1 + c4v)
(1 − c2
4)(1 − ν2)(1 − c4ν)
. (35)
What is the eﬀect of a change in taxation here?
Note that the special case of the previous subsection shows here as well: With no corre-
lation, i.e. v =0 , t h ev a r i a n c ei sg i v e nb yc2
3σ2/(1 − c2
4). Given that c3 is independent of τ
and c4 falls in τ, a higher tax decreases the variance of wealth and thereby its coeﬃcient of
variation.
In the case of ν>0, the result can also easily be seen: A smaller c4, caused by a higher
tax rate, decreases the numerator and increases both terms (1 − c2
4) and (1 − c4ν) in the
denominator. As a result, the variance and the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth decreases
through a higher tax rate. The intuition for this ﬁnding is unchanged when compared with
the previous subsection.
5.3 The distribution of wealth and the Gini coeﬃcient
Our coeﬃcient of variation results were rather general in that they only required the existence
of the ﬁrst and second moment of ait, thus requiring us solely to specify the expected value
and variance of the individual productivities lit in (1). Other commonly used measures of
inequality are more diﬃcult to analyze in our setup. For example, a measure of inequality
widely used in the public is the amount of wealth owned by the richest π%o ft h ep o p u l a t i o n .
18As this amount is generally far higher than π% of total wealth, a society is viewed to
have become more equal if this amount reduces. Perfect equality would mean that for any
π ∈ [0,100], π% of the population own π% of the total wealth. The corresponding Gini
coeﬃcient (or indeed any reasonable measure of inequality) would then be zero.
Unfortunately, the Gini and related indices require information beyond the lower-order
moments. Nevertheless, in order to obtain some insights on the robustness of our results to
the choice of inequality measure, we now study further details on the exact distribution of
wealth - making stronger assumptions than in preceding sections. We then brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
some simulation results for the Gini coeﬃcient.





4 lis by Σt
s=1c3c
s−1
4 lis ≡ Σt











For any ﬁxed t,t h eﬁrst two terms amount to a (non-stochastic) shift to the right,
while the remaining term represents the sum of independent but not identically distributed
random variables. Exact distributions of such quantities are, in general, not easily available.
A simple closed-form solution for Σt
s=1Xs would exist if we assumed the lis to be normally
distributed; however, this would imply the possibility of negative productivities (and thereby
wages) which is not plausible. More generally, distributions of sums are available if one is
willing to assume, like Ioannides and Sato (1987), that earned income follows a (non-normal)
stable distribution. Unfortunately, stable distributions create further problems: The normal
distribution is the only stable distribution admitting a ﬁnite variance. Hence, the coeﬃcient
of variation is not meaningful for non-normal stable laws. Inﬁnite variances are also not well
supported by the data.
It would therefore be desirable to choose a distribution not possessing these drawbacks
while remaining reasonably tractable. A recent survey of models for the size distribution of
income is provided by Kleiber and Kotz (2003). One plausible candidate for the distribution
of productivities lis is the two-parameter gamma distribution, suggested by Salem and Mount
(1974) among others, with density f(lit)= 1
λφΓ(φ)l
φ−1
it e−lit/λ,p a r a m e t e r sλ>0 and φ>0,
support [0,∞) and Γ(φ) representing the gamma function, Γ(φ)=
R ∞
0 tφ−1e−tdt.I ns h o r t ,
we assume lis ∼ Ga(φ,λ). Recall that for Y = cX the density of Y is given by fY(y)=

















19A representation obtained by Moschopoulos (1985), see App. 7.3 for further details,
provides the density g of Σt








Γ(tφ + k)˜ β
tφ+k,y > 0, (38)
where ˜ β = c3λc
t−1








s=1 (1 − c
s
4)
i ,k =0 ,1,2,....
Recalling that, for Z = Y + d, the density of Z is given by fZ(z)=fY(z − d), the density





This expression, although fairly complex when compared to textbook densities, is quite
convenient for computational purposes and allows, among other things, to evaluate and plot
the exact density of the distribution of wealth for any t.( A l t e r n a t i v e s p e c i ﬁcations of the
distribution of the lis generally lead to even more involved objects.)
In order to obtain some insights for the Gini coeﬃcient we conducted a limited simulation
study on the basis of (38). Recall that the expectation of a gamma random variable X is
given by E(X)=φλ. An empirically plausible value for the shape parameter φ is 3,i n
order to have E(lis)=1as required by (1) we chose λ =1 /3. We set the remaining model
parameters to α =0 .7, β =0 .7, γ =0 .3, δ =0 .8 and A =2a n dc o n s i d e r e da ne c o n o m y
comprising n =1 0 ,000 agents, initially after t =2 0periods; this was replicated 1,000 times.
Our results suggest that the Gini coeﬃcient, like the coeﬃcient of variation, is decreasing
in τ, where we employed τ =0 .1(0.1)0.5. Simulations for longer time horizons of t =5 0
and t =1 0 0conﬁrmed these ﬁndings. It would seem that our results on the inequality of
wealth are not conﬁned to the coeﬃcient of variation, although alternative measures are
considerable harder to study analytically.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzed the impact of bequests on the distribution of wealth assuming a joy-of-
giving motive. We distinguish between the eﬀect of bequests per se and taxation of bequests.
Bequests per se are captured by a preference parameter (1−β) which measures the "utility-
elasticity of bequests", i.e. the willingness of parents to bequeath. The higher the parents
willingness to give, the higher is the share of parental disposable income the child receives.
The paper shows that both expected wealth and the variance of wealth go up with higher
joy-of-giving. Since the eﬀect on expected wealth dominates, the coeﬃcient of variation also
20goes down: More bequests make the distribution of wealth more equal. The reason for this
result is the eﬀect bequests have on capital accumulation which we took into account in our
general equilibrium analysis.
From a policy perspective, by levying a wealth transfer tax and redistributing revenue
among the young generation, the government can further reduce the concentration of wealth.
The higher the tax τ on bequests, the lower is the variance of wealth, while average wealth
holdings are not aﬀected. As a consequence, the coeﬃcient of variation is reduced by the
tax. Hence, the government can follow a bequest taxation policy in order to reduce wealth
inequality, even though bequests per se - the willingness to bequeath - already result in lower
wealth inequality. We ﬁnd this inequality-reducing eﬀect of taxation (which would also be
found in unintended-bequest setups) due to our assumption of a joy-of-giving motive which
removes Becker-Tomes type "family wealth" considerations.
While these results hold for the coeﬃcient of variation as a measure of inequality, simula-
tion suggests that they also hold for other, "more popular" measures like the Gini coeﬃcient.
Taxing bequests reduces not only the coeﬃcient of variation but also the Gini coeﬃcient.
The appendix to this paper analyses various extensions - CES utility and endogenous
labour supply. We show that the ﬁrst result - bequests per se increase equality due to
capital accumulation - is robust to these extensions. Future work could check whether the
taxation result also survives under these more general speciﬁcations.
7 Appendix
7.1 The time preference rate
This appendix derives the time preference rate (TPR) for the utility function (5). Given our
proposal of a deﬁnition for the TPR, it shows that the time preference rate is a function only
of α. The parameter β aﬀects only the decision of how to split second period expenditures
between consumption and bequests. Surprisingly, this issue has not explicitly been discussed
in the literature before.
T h et i m ep r e f e r e n c er a t ec a nb ed e ﬁned as the marginal rate of substitution between ct







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ct=ct+1
. (39)













A change in β indeed changes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. An alternative










it+1. This also yields (40).
If we view the TPR, however, as reﬂecting discounting between present and future points
in time with respect to utility levels and thereby view second period expenditure to consist of









it+1 +( 1− β)lnbit+1
¤¢. (41)





We believe that the deﬁnition in (41) is more appropriate in our context as the narrow
deﬁnition with respect to consumption levels in (39) neglects that in period two there is
expenditure also for bequests (which could be viewed as a second consumption good).
Any change in β we undertake later in the paper therefore is a change about preference
within period 2. It is not a change in intertemporal preferences. This can also be seen from
(6) and (7) where consumption and saving in the ﬁrst period depends on α only and not on
β. 12
7.2 Two extensions
The model we present can relatively easily be extended in two directions: We can allow for
CES utility functions and for endogenous labour supply. Our primary ﬁndings are conﬁrmed
and closed form solutions still exist.
7.2.1 CES utility
Consider a household whose utility function is given by a CES formulation for period one












, 0 <θ<1. (43)
12We are grateful to Larry Epstein for some brief but very helpful remarks.
22Optimal second period behaviour splits savings between consumption and bequests as before,
see (8) and (9),
c
o
it+1 = βsit [1 + rt+1],b it+1 =
(1 − β)sit [1 + rt+1]
1+τ
. (44)
Inserting the budget constraint from period one and this solution into (43) gives




(βsit [1 + rt+1])
β
µ
(1 − β)sit [1 + rt+1]
1+τ
¶1−β#1−θ
≡ α[Bt − sit]















Maximizing (45) with respect to sit yields α[1 − θ][Bt − sit]
−θ =( 1 − α)(1− θ)Φs
−θ
it ⇔













In order to understand the evolution of wealth, we write in analogy to (18)






oε (wtlit + bit + gt). (47)

























Also in analogy to the Cobb-Douglas case, we analyze properties of ait by assuming that
the economy is in a macroeconomic steady state. The equation replacing (20) then becomes








































In order to be able to say more about ait, we would have to determine whether c7 < 1.
While this is analytically cumbersome, we know from a diﬀerent line of reasoning that it needs
to be smaller than unity indeed. Assume it is larger than one and remember that the economy
is in a macroeconomic steady state with a constant capital stock. With c7 > 1, the average
wealth holding of families would increase. As this is a contradiction to a macroeconomic
steady state, we conclude that c7 < 1 indeed. Then, corresponding to (22), the expected
value of ait becomes
E (ait)=c
t
























We can now proceed as in section 4.1 and compare wealth inequality of two economies
in steady state, one where parents bequeath part of their wealth and one where they do not.
Assume that in economy A parents consume their savings in the second period (β =1 )while
in economy B part of wealth is left to the child. In economy B, assuming that there is no
tax on bequests levied (therefore c8 =0 ), the coeﬃcient of variation is from (51) and (50) -




































. Again, in the bequest-economy B
wealth inequality is lower.
7.2.2 Endogenous labour supply
Consider an extension of our utility function (2) which includes a labour-leisure choice.







, we have Uit = U(c
y
it,Λit,c o
it+1,b it+1), where Λit is the
share of time used for leisure. The budget constraint when young needs to be modiﬁed to
read
wtlit [1 − Λit]+bit + gt = c
y
it + sit. (52)
24The budget constraint of the old remains as in (4). As in (5), we use a Cobb-Douglas type
utility function augmented to capture the additional ﬁrst period trade-oﬀ,l e t t i n gξ capture
the preference for leisure,
Uit = α[lnc
y




it+1 +( 1− β)lnbit+1
¤
.
Again, optimal second period behaviour splits savings between consumption and bequests
as in (8), (9) or (44). The utility function therefore becomes
Uit = α[lnc
y













Deﬁning Ψ ≡ ln
µ






and inserting the ﬁrst period budget
constraint (52) provides a well-deﬁned maximization problem where sit and Λit are to be
chosen,
Uit = α[ln(wtlit [1 − Λit]+bit + gt − sit)+ξ lnΛit]+( 1− α)[Ψ +l nsit].
The ﬁrst order condition for sit is
α




⇔ αsit =( 1− α)[wtlit [1 − Λit]+bit + gt − sit]
⇔ sit =( 1− α)[wtlit [1 − Λit]+bit + gt], (53)
an expression that looks very familiar. The ﬁrst order condition for leisure reads
wtlit




⇔ wtlitΛit = ξα[wtlit [1 − Λit]+bit + gt],
where the second step inserted savings and rearranged. Solving for leisure gives










This solution has familiar properties as well. If there was no non-labour income, Cobb-
Douglas preferences would imply constant labour supply, Λit = ξα/(1 + ξα). Given the
presence of bequests and government income, a higher wage rate wt and higher individual
productivity lit imply that the percentage Λit of time spent as leisure decreases and labour
supply increases.
Inserting (54) into the savings expression (53) gives












+ bit + gt
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[wtlit + bit + gt]+bit + gt
¸






[wtlit + bit + gt]=
1 − α
1+ξα
[wtlit + bit + gt].
25A si nt h em a i nt e x ti n( 1 8 )a n di nt h eﬁrst extension in (47), this allows us to express wealth
ait+1 as a linear diﬀerence equation which provides information about the various moments
and other distributional measures of wealth,
ait+1 = sit =
1 − α
1+ξα
[wtlit + bit + gt].




¯ w, c10 =
1 − α
1+ξα
(1 − β)(1+¯ r)
1+τ
gives the equation corresponding to (20) or (48),




Being interested only in the eﬀect of bequests (leaving other aspects for future research),
we set taxes equal to zero. This simpliﬁes this equation to ait+1 = c9lit + c10ait. Solving


















10. Hence, the coeﬃcient of














1+c10. In the non-





= σ. As c10 < 1,
the bequest economy has again lower inequality.
7.3 The sum of independent gamma random variables
The quantity of interest is Σt
s=1Xs, i.e. the distribution of the sum of independent but not
identically distributed gamma random variables. There are numerous representations of this
object in the statistical literature, for our purposes a result due to Moschopoulos (1985) is
the most convenient.
Lemma 1 (Moschopoulos, 1985) Consider Y ≡ Σt
s=1Xs where the Xs are independent






Γ(˜ φ + k)˜ β
˜ φ+k,y > 0,
where ˜ φ ≡
Pt












δ0 =1 ,a n dγi = Σt
s=1φs
³
1 − ˜ β/βs
´i
/i.
26Note that, apart from the weight δk,t h ekth term in the series, y
˜ φ+k−1e−y/˜ β/{Γ(˜ φ +
k)˜ β
˜ φ+k
}, is the density of a Gamma(˜ φ + k,˜ β)v a r i a b l e .
Applying this lemma to our case (37), we have φs ≡ φ for all s, hence ˜ φ = tφ,a n d
˜ β ≡ mins βs = c3λc
t−1
4 (since 0 <c 4 < 1). This implies ˜ β/βs = c
t−s
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4 . This is the representation used in
the text.
An additional appendix (referred to in the text by app. A.x) is available at
www.waelde.com/publications.html.
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